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THE FORESEEABILITY OF TRANSFERENCE:
EXTENDING EMPLOYER LIABILITY UNDER
WASHINGTON LAW FOR THERAPIST SEXUAL

EXPLOITATION OF PATIENTS
Timothy E. Allen, M.A.
Abstract: Transference, or the idealization of therapists, is a phenomenon that is
foreseeable in every relationship between a therapist and a patient, and makes patients
uniquely vulnerable to sexual exploitation by therapists. Transference has been recognized as
a basis for finding therapists directly liable for harm resulting from sexual relations with
patients. However, limitations on damages directly available from therapists lead patients to
seek redress from therapists' employers under theories of employer liability. Washington
courts generally deny victimized patients relief from the employers of sexually exploitative
therapists. This Comment argues that Washington courts should impose employer liability
when therapists sexually exploit their patients, due to the foreseeability of transference.
Employer liability is consistent with three existing theories of Washington agency law: (1)the
exploitation of transference arises out of pursuit of the employer's business, subjecting
employers to respondeat superior liability; (2) patients qualify for a special relationship with
their therapist's employer, which imposes a direct duty on the employer to protect those
patients; and (3) the risk of a therapist's exploitation of transference is sufficiently foreseeable
to subject employers to liability on the basis of negligent supervision.

S.H.C. became a follower of a prominent Buddhist priest.' After years
of devotion, she sought the priest's counsel for curing her headaches.2
The priest informed S.H.C. that her headaches should be the least of her
worries, as he sensed she would soon die. However, the priest offered to
both save her life and cure her headaches by treating her with the "Twin
Body Blessing."4 After three years of the priest's periodic "cure" in the
form of sexual intercourse, S.H.C. sued the priest's temple under various
theories of employer liability.' Division I of the Washington Court of
Appeals upheld the trial court's dismissal of all claims against the
temple, 6 interpreting Washington agency law to require a "special
relationship" between S.H.C. and the temple before the temple could be
held directly liable for any harm caused by the priest's intentional acts.
After reviewing available Washington precedent, the court held that
1.S.H.C. v. Lu, 113 Wash. App. 511, 515, 54 P.3d 174, 175 (2002).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 515,54 P.3d at 176.
6. Id. at531,54P.3dat 184.
7. Id. at 525, 54 P.3d at 180.
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S.H.C. did not have a special relationship with the temple because her
status as an adult made her "unlike the victims who have been found to
be vulnerable in other cases." 8 The appellate court also refused to impose
direct liability on the temple under a theory of negligent supervision. 9
The case of S.H.C. highlights the shortcomings in Washington law
regarding tort liability for employers of sexually exploitative therapists. 0
Therapists' employers face minimal liability in Washington courts for
therapist sexual misconduct. Some courts have found employee sexual
misconduct necessarily beyond the scope of employment."' Other courts,
although willing to entertain theories of direct employer liability, have
found that employers could not have reasonably foreseen the intentional
tortious misconduct of their therapist employees. 2
However, Washington courts recognize that therapists may be
personally liable for harm caused by sexual relationships with patients on
the basis that such harm is foreseeable due to patients' vulnerability. 3
Washington common law considers patients presumptively incapable of
consenting to sexual relationships with their current therapists," 4 and a
state criminal statute imposes the burden of proving patient consent on
8. Id. at 525-26, 54 P.3d at 18 1.
9. Id. at 523-24, 54 P.3d at 180. While recognizing that genuine issues of fact existed as to
whether the temple knew of the priest's sexual activities, the appellate court reasoned that the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment bars a civil court from imposing a duty of care on a
religious authority, even where an employee's sexual misconduct was known to the authority. ld.
The relationship of the First Amendment to employer liability for sexual exploitation by religious
counselors is beyond the scope of this Comment. Jurisdictions are divided over the extent to which
liability can be imposed on religious institutions that employ sexually exploitative clergy. See
generally Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Liabilit, of Church or Religious Organization for
Negligent Hiring, Retention, or Supervision of Priest, Minister, or Other Clergy Based on Sexual
Misconduct, 101 A.L.R. 5th 1 (2002); Janice D. Villiers, Clergy Malpractice Revisited: Liability.jbr
Sexual Misconduct in the Counseling Relationship, 74 DENy. U. L. REV. I(1996); James T. O'Reilly
& JoAnn M. Strasser, Clergy Sexual Misconduct: Confronting the Difficult Constitutional and
Istitutional Liability Issues, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 31 (1994).
10. This Comment follows the Supreme Court of Minnesota by using the tenm "therapist" to refer
to "a psychologist or psychiatrist, or, at times, to other professionals who hold themselves out as
engaging in psychotherapy or counseling therapy for marital, family and sexual problems." St. Paul
Fire & Mar. Ins. Co. v. Love. 459 N.W.2d 698, 700 n.l (Minn. 1990).
11.See infra notes 122-131 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 187-197 and accompanying text.
13. See Omer v. Edgren, 38 Wash. App. 376, 378, 685 P.2d 635, 636 (1984) (analogizing
relationship between psychiatrist and patient to that between guardian and ward, in which consent to
sexual seduction is necessarily illusory); Wash. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Hicks, 49 Wash. App. 623, 627,
744 P.2d 625, 627 (1987) (recognizing legal liability appropriate where therapist mishandles
transference phenomenon by engaging in sexual relationship with patient).
14. Omer, 38 Wash. App, at 378, 685 P.2d at 636.

Employer Liability for Therapist Sexual Misconduct
therapists who raise it as an affirmative defense to charges of sexual
misconduct. 5 Courts and legislatures are rightly suspicious of consent
defenses because the ability of a patient to consent to a sexual
relationship with her 6 therapist has long been questioned in the literature
of psychoanalysis, in codes of professional ethics, and in law.' 7 The
idealization of therapists by patients, also known as the transference
phenomenon, 8 is a foreseeable occurrence in a normal counseling
relationship. 9 Transference makes patients particularly vulnerable to
therapist
suggestion and imposes upon therapists a heightened duty of
0
care.

2

Employers of exploitative therapists in Washington should be liable
for the devastating harms that victims often suffer. Many studies
document the extensive damage caused to patients by therapist sexual
exploitation. 2' Yet the availability of direct damages from therapists is
limited, leading plaintiffs to seek redress instead from the tortious
therapists' employers.22 However, under existing Washington law,
plaintiffs lose suits against employers, whether pursued under theories of
15. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.050 (2002).
16. While recognizing that exceptions exist to the general rule,
this Comment will use male
pronouns when referring to therapists and female pronouns when referring to patients, as the vast
majority of sexual relationships arising from transference are between persons of those biological
sexes. See St. Paul Fire & Mar. Ins. Co. v. Love, 459 N.W.2d 698, 700 n.1(Minn. 1990); Malkah T.
Notman & Carol C. Nadelson, Psychotherapy With Patients Who Have HadSexual Relations With A
Previous Therapist,in PHYSICIAN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 248 (Joseph D. Bloom et al. eds., 1999).
17. See infra Part 1.B (explaining that transference makes patients vulnerable to sexual
exploitation by therapists). See also Morgan v. Psychiatric Inst. of Wash., 692 A.2d 417, 421-22
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding therapist exploitation of transference denied patient ability to consent to
sexual relationship with therapist); Ferguson v. People, 824 P.2d 803, 812-13 (Colo. 1992) (holding
elimination of consent defense in state statute criminalizing psychotherapist-patient sexual relations
not an unconstitutional violation of Due Process); Missouri v. Cone, 3 S.W.3d 833, 842 (Mo. 1999)
(upholding psychiatrist's conviction for sexual assault of' two patients where plaintiffs unable to
appreciate their actions due to manipulation of transference and patients' severe mental
incapacitation). But see L.A.B. v. P.N., 533 N.W.2d 413, 417 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding loyalty
to therapist caused by transference phenomenon insufficient to toll running of statute of limitations
for medical malpractice under provision for "insanity"); State v. Leiding, 812 P.2d 797, 799-800
(N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (holding transference phenomenon cannot satisfy element of state statute
criminalizing sexual penetration where victim suffers from "mental condition" rendering victim
"incapable of understanding the nature or consequences of the act").
18. See infra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
19. See Doe v. Finch, 81 Wash. App. 342, 352, 914 P.2d 756, 762 (1996) (quoting statement of
plaintiff's expert witness that it "is well known that patients commonly become infatuated with their
therapists").
20. See infra notes 49-72 and accompanying text.
21. See infra Part l.B.
22. See infra Part II.A.
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vicarious or direct liability. 23 This leaves many victims of foreseeable
therapist exploitation without an effective remedy.
This Comment argues that employer liability for a therapist's
exploitation of the transference phenomenon satisfies existing
Washington tests for both vicarious and direct employer liability. The
transference phenomenon is inherent to the therapeutic relationship,
making the risk of therapist exploitation of transference foreseeable to
employers. Because the dynamics of transference arise out of the
employer's pursuit of business, Washington courts should recognize
vicarious employer liability under the theory of respondeat superior.
Further, therapists' patients satisfy the current definition of parties that
deserve a special relationship with an employer, thus warranting direct
employer liability. Finally, employers should face liability when they are
negligent in supervising therapists, because the risk of exploiting
transference is foreseeable.
This Comment begins with a description of the transference
phenomenon. Part I defines transference, explores the potential harm
patients suffer due to sexual relations with current or former therapists,
and summarizes the reasons why therapists' employers should
reasonably foresee the risk that therapists might exploit transference.
Part I1reviews existing legal tests in Washington for holding employers
liable for intentional employee misconduct and describes how
Washington courts have not held employers liable for the foreseeable
harms caused by therapist employees who sexually exploit patients by
mishandling transference. In response to these shortcomings, Part III
argues that the foreseeability of transference supports the extension of
tort liability to employers of sexually exploitative therapists.
1.

THE TRANSFERENCE PHENOMENON POSES A
FORESEEABLE RISK THAT THERAPISTS MIGHT
SEXUALLY EXPLOIT PATIENTS

The transference phenomenon is a regular and foreseeable aspect of
therapy. 24 Although it is a normal part of successful therapy, transference
puts therapists in positions of power and authority that are subject to
23. See infra Parts ll.B.-ll.D.
24. See Sigmund Freud, Transference, in INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS 431,
442-43 (James Strachey trans. & ed., 1966) (noting that "transference is intimately bound up with
the nature of the illness itself' and "is present in the patient from the beginning of the treatment");
infra notes 28-48 and accompanying text.

Employer Liability for Therapist Sexual Misconduct
abuse and mishandling.25 When therapists exploit transference for sexual
gratification, patients suffer a variety of harms.26 Courts find that the
foreseeability of patient harm is a basis for imposing liability on both
therapists and their employers when the transference phenomenon is
exploited. 7
A.

Transference is a ForeseeablePhenomenon in the Therapeutic
Relationship

Therapists regularly probe their patients' minds and learn the intimate
details of their patients' lives.28 A zone of intimacy called transference
develops during this process,29 which makes it common for a
psychotherapy patient to "fall in love with" or "idolize" the therapist.3"
Transference has been defined as "the process whereby the patient
displaces on to the therapist feelings, attitudes and attributes which
properly belong to a significant attachment figure of the past.., and
responds to the therapist accordingly."']
As a common and expected occurrence, transference is a foreseeable
phenomenon in therapy.32 Practitioners note that "[flor any patient to
experience an erotic transference is ... entirely normal and expectable in

the course of psychotherapy."33 Mental health professionals expect and
even elicit transference as a regular and accepted part of treatment.34 The
proper instigation and response to transference is considered a basic
psychoanalytic technique.35 In order to work through repressed feelings

25. See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.

27. See infra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
28. STEVEN B. BISBING ET AL., SEXUAL ABUSE BY PROFESSIONALS: A LEGAL GUIDE 210
(1995).
29. MacClements v. LaFone, 408 S.E.2d 878, 880 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991).
30. Doe v. Finch, 81 Wash. App. 342, 352, 914 P.2d 756, 762 (1996) (quoting statement of
plaintiffs expert witness).

31. St. Paul Fire & Mar. Ins. Co. v. Love, 459 N.W.2d 698, 700 (Minn. 1990) (quoting S.
WALDRON-SKINNER, A DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOTHERAPY 364 (1986)).

32. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
33. Kenneth S. Pope & Glen 0. Gabbard, Individual Psychotherapyfor Victims of TherapistPatient Sexual Intimacy, in SEXUAL EXPLOITATION IN PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 99 (Gabbard

ed., 1989),
34. Iwanski v. Gomes, 611 N.W.2d 607, 615 (Neb. 2000).
35. Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753, 755 n.l (Mo. 1968) (quoting BLAKISTON'S NEW GOULD
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1260 (2d ed. 1956)).
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and memories, the patient must often project those feelings
upon
36
someone trained to channel the feelings in a healthy direction.
The appropriate handling of transference is defined for therapists by
the standard practices of their profession. Therapists are trained to
anticipate and deal appropriately with transference when it emerges in
the therapeutic relationship.37 Emergent transference is recognized by
inappropriate emotions directed toward the therapist. 3 Once recognized,

a therapist should "reject the patient's erotic overtures and explain to the
patient the true origin of her feelings" in emotions felt toward other
important figures in her life.39
Therapists are also trained to avoid the mishandling of transference. A
therapist may be tempted to reciprocate the intimate feelings proffered by
a patient caught in the grips of transference.4" The proper response is
counter-transference, requiring the therapist to self-monitor for
developing feelings of intimacy4" and to avoid emotional involvement
with the patient." Should a therapist find he is becoming inappropriately
involved with a patient, he should terminate treatment and refer the
patient to another therapist.43
Transference is foreseeable in every therapeutic relationship. While
some courts restrict the duty to properly handle transference to licensed
mental health professionals on the theory that only they "offer a course
of treatment and counseling predicated upon handling the transference
phenomenon,' other courts have also imposed this duty on other types
of counselors. 45 The transference phenomenon is not confined to mental
health therapy 46 but can arise in any counseling relationship, 47 even
pastoral counseling.48
36. See MacClements v. LaFone, 408 S.E.2d 878, 880 (N.C. Ct.App. 1991).
37. Melvin S. Heller, Some Comments to Lawyers on the Practice of Psychiatry. TEMP. L. Q. 401,
402 (1957).
38. Id.
at401-02.
39. St. Paul Fire & Mar. Ins. Co. v. Love, 459 N.W.2d 698, 700 (Minn. 1990).
40. See, e.g., Stuart W. Twemlow & Glen 0. Gabbard, The Lovesick Therapist, in SEXUAL
EXPLOITATION IN PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS, 71, 73-83 (Gabbard ed., 1989) (exploring the
motivations of therapists who fall in love with their patients).
4 1.Id. at 85-87; see Notman & Nadelson, su)ra note 16, at 257-58.
42. Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. McCabe, 556 F. Supp. 1342, 1346 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
43. Love, 459 N.W.2d at 700.
44. Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1986).
45. See, e.g., Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Stone, 61 F.3d 1321, 1325 (7th Cir. 1995) (considering
licensed social worker a "psychotherapist" under sexual exploitation statute).
46. Damaby v. Davis, 57 P.3d 100, 103 n.l (Okla. Civ. App. 2002).

Employer Liability for Therapist Sexual Misconduct
B.

The Abuse or Negligent Mishandlingof Transference Results in
ForeseeableHarm to Patients

Transference lends itself to abuse by therapists. Transference puts
therapists in positions of power and authority that are easily exploited or
mishandled,49 because patients come to perceive therapists as powerful,
benevolent figures.5" Studies of therapists indicate the temptation to take
advantage of their position can prove overwhelming: therapists who have
had sexual relationships with patients admit that the sexual contact was
for their own gratification, 5' and the proportion of therapists selfreporting sexual contact with patients is as much as twelve percent.5 2
Most patients lack the ability to give meaningful consent to a sexual
relationship with a therapist. Patients who become involved in such
relationships tend to be unusually vulnerable.53 Studies show that the
most reliable predictor of such sexual involvement is prior sexual
victimization, usually in the form of childhood incest. 4 One
commentator notes that, in cases where therapist sexual exploitation is
alleged, expert witnesses often testify that therapist-patient sexuality is
analogous to parent-child incest.55 Endorsing this analogy, the Ninth
Circuit has recognized that a sexual relationship between a therapist and
a patient "replicat[es] at a symbolic level the situation in which a parent
would be sexual with a child."56
Sexual relationships premised upon the exploitation of transference
pose the risk of serious harm to patients. Common effects include
47. Nelson v. Gillette, 571 N.W.2d 332, 341 (N.D. 1997).
48. Paul Johnson, The Mission: Theological Foundationand Uniqueness of Pastoral Counseling,
in BASIC TYPES OF PASTORAL COUNSELING 41, 50 (1984).

49. BISBING, supranote 28, at 210.
50. Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1365 (9th Cir. 1986).
51. S.L. Zelen, Sexualization of Therapeutic Relationships: The Dual Vulnerability of Patientand
Therapist, 22 PSYCHOTHERAPY 178, 182 (1985).
52. BISBING, supra note 28, at 199. See also Gary C. Hankins et al., Patient-TherapistSexual
Involvement: A Review of Clinical and Research Data, 22 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 109,
123 (1994) ("At least 10 percent of male and 3 percent of female psychotherapists will acknowledge
being sexually involved with patients, and a sizeable portion of these professionals are involved with
multiple patients.").
53. American Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Sexual Misconduct in
the Practiceof Medicine, 266 J.AM. MED. ASS'N 2741, 2743 (1991).
54. Id
55. Jacqueline Bouhoutsos et al., Sexual Intimacy Between Psychotherapists and Patients, 14
PROF. PSYCHOL. RES. & PRAC. 185 (1983).

56. Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1365 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting testimony of
plaintiff's expert witness).
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"increased depression, loss of motivation, impaired social adjustment,
significant emotional disturbance, suicidal feelings or behavior, and
increased drug or alcohol use."57 Victimized patients experience feelings

of abandonment, humiliation, and anger, and suffer from decreased selfesteem.5 The harm to the patient may also be aggravated, after the
relationship has ended because a therapist who exploits transference
seriously damages his patient's ability to trust future therapists.59 Studies

indicate that over ninety percent of patients who are sexually victimized
by therapists suffer serious residual harm.60 The compensatory damages
available in actions against sexually exploitative therapists include

awards for past and future pain and suffering, medical expenses,
diminution in earning capacity, lost wages, loss of consortium or
services, and the reasonable value of the therapists' services. 6 Sexual

relationships between other professional counselors and their clients pose
the risk of similar harm.62

The exploitation of transference makes certain relationships between
therapists and patients susceptible to legal intervention. Not every

personal relationship between therapists and patients reflects the
exploitation of transference.6 3 If a client has consented to a sexual
relationship with her therapist in the absence of the power imbalance that

is characteristic of transference, the relationship is no more suspect than
any other relationship between consenting adults.64 However, because of
57. Bouhoutsos et al., supra note 55, at 190.
58. See Shirley Feldman-Summers & G. Jones, PsychologicalImpacts of Sexual Contact Between
Therapists or Other Health Care Practitionersand Their Clients, 52 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 1054, 1055 (1984); Zelen, supra note 51, at 181-82.
59. Twemlow & Gabbard, supra note 40, at 84.
60. Feldman-Suminers & Jones, supra note 58, at 1055.
61. Elizabeth Williams, Cause of Action for Negligence or Malpractice of Psychiatrist, 13
CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 453, § 43 (1999).
62. See, e.g., Shirley Feldman-Summers, Sexual Contact in Fiduciar, Relationships, in SEXUAL
EXPLOITATION IN PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 193, 205-09 (Gabbard ed., 1989) (arguing that the
risk of harm due to therapist-client sexual contact is present in other fiduciary-client relationships);
JOEL FRIEDMAN & MARCIA MOBILIA BOUMIL, BETRAYAL OF TRUST: SEX AND POWER IN
PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 30-43 (1995) (arguing that sexual relations with clergy, attorneys,
professors and physicians are harmful to their clients).
63. See, e.g., Doe v. Swift, 570 So.2d 1209, 1213 (Ala. 1990) (noting transference requires period
of time for trust in therapist to develop); Sisson v. Seneca Mental Health Council, 404 S.E.2d 425,
429 (W. Va. 1991) (holding transference requires both period of time for trust to develop as well as

actual therapy sessions).
64. Cf Jacobsen v. Muller, 352 S.E.2d 604, 607 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (holding summary judgment
for psychologist appropriate where plaintiff was aware that sexual advances were beyond the duties
of psychologist yet responded positively).

Employer Liability for Therapist Sexual Misconduct
the high risk of harm to clients who enter such relationships under the
influence of transference, many states impose some form of liability on
therapists who exploit transference by engaging in sexual relations with
their clients.65 Similarly, therapist organizations uniformly proscribe
therapist-patient sexual relations in their codes of professional ethics.66
Courts have held that the foreseeability of transference can serve as a
basis for both therapist and employer liability for the harm caused to
patients by sexual relations with therapists. In Simmons v. United
States,67 the Ninth Circuit invoked the established nature of the
transference phenomenon to distinguish between the heightened duty
imposed on therapists to refrain from sexual relations with clients and the
lesser duty owed by other professionals to clients.68 The court found the
transference phenomenon to be a normal professional technique whose
mishandling would constitute malpractice, stressing that "the same kind
of authority power" held by the therapist is also held by any "powerful,
benevolent parent figure. 70 More recently, a federal district court in the
Eastern District of Virginia ruled that the widespread public awareness of
the problem of therapist sexual exploitation justified imposing employer
liability for therapist sexual misconduct. 7I The failure to explore the role
of transference in an allegation of therapist sexual exploitation may even
constitute attorney malpractice.72
65. Many states criminalize therapist-patient sexual contact. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-1418 (West 2001); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 729 (West 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 12-43-222(I)(r), 12-43-226(2) (West 2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-71(a)(6) (West
2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 491.0112 (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-5.1(c)(2) (Harrison 1999);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.15 (West 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.345 (West 2002); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-20-06.1 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(l)(g) (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
22-22-29 (Michie 1998); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.011 (b)(9) (Vernon 2002); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 940.22(2) (West 2002). Additionally, some states impose statutory civil liability. See, e.g., CAL.
CIV. CODE § 43.93(b)(2) (West 2003); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 140/2(2) (West 2002); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 148a.02 (West 1989); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 81.002 (Vernon 1997);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.70(2) (West 2002).
66. See Elissa P. Benedek & David Wahl, Sexual Misconduct, The American Psychiatric
Association, and the American Medical Association, in PHYSICIAN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 96-102
(Joseph D. Bloom et al. eds., 1999).
67. 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986).
68. Id. at 1366.
69. Id. at 1365.
70. Id. (quoting testimony of plaintiff's expert witness).
71. Doe v. United States, 912 F. Supp. 193, 194-95 (E.D. Va. 1995).
72. See Jacobsen v. Boyle, 397 S.E.2d 1,2-3 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (holding a question of fact
whether attorney committed malpractice by failing to introduce expert testimony on the phenomenon
of transference in action by plaintiff against sexually exploitative therapist).
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In sum, transference is a normal and foreseeable phenomenon in
effective therapy. 73 Therapists are trained to anticipate transference and
respond to it in a manner that furthers their patients' well-being.74
However, transference also provides an opportunity for therapists to
sexually exploit their patients.75 Courts have recognized that the
foreseeability of transference may give rise to liability for therapists and
their employers when patients are harmed by such sexual exploitation.76
II.

WASHINGTON LAW CURRENTLY LIMITS PLAINTIFFS'
ABILITY TO OBTAIN RELIEF FOR THERAPIST SEXUAL
EXPLOITATION

Therapists can be held directly liable for harm caused by sexual
relations with their patients.77 However, the limitations on damages
recoverable from therapists lead plaintiffs to seek compensation from
their therapists' employers. 78 Employers of exploitative therapists may be
found liable under one form of vicarious and two forms of direct
employer liability.79 One form of vicarious liability, respondeat superior,
holds an employer liable for the torts of an employee.8" Respondeat
superior liability, unlike direct liability, does not require the injured party
to prove fault on the part of the employer.8 The two forms of direct
employer liability require plaintiffs to prove either (1) the employer
breached a duty owed by the employer directly to third parties, or (2) the
employer's own negligence in supervising its employee. 82 Plaintiffs in
Washington courts have sued employers of sexually exploitative
therapists under all three theories of liability with relatively little
83
success.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 100-106 and accompanying text.
BISBING, supra note 28, at 181.

80. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 905 (2000).

81. See id at 906.
82. BISBING, supra note 28, at 181-82.
83. See infra notes 122-131, 169-172, 195-197 and accompanying text.

Employer Liability for Therapist Sexual Misconduct

A.

Washington Law Imposes DirectLiability on Therapists, but the
Limited Damages Available to Victims Leads Them to Seek Further
Redressfrom the Therapists'Employers

Washington law imposes liability on therapists for harm resulting
from sexual relations with patients. In Omer v. Edgren, 4 Division III of
the Washington Court of Appeals held that a fiduciary relationship 5
exists between a psychiatrist and patient.86 Analogizing the relationship
to that between a guardian and ward, the court held that sexual relations
between a psychiatrist and patient may cause actionable harm due to the
"malpractice, deceit, assault, and coercion by a person in a position of
overpowering influence and trust."87 In Omer, the plaintiff had an
ongoing sexual relationship with her psychiatrist during her fifteen years
of treatment." The court noted that permitting a patient who had been the
victim of "deliberate and malicious abuse of power and breach of trust by
a psychiatrist" to pursue a civil remedy, vindicated not only "a wrong
against her" but also a wrong against "the public interest as well."'8 9
Therapists are subject to malpractice liability where they mishandle
the transference phenomenon. Therapist liability is premised upon the
unique characteristics of psychotherapy as a profession. 90 Mishandling
transference by engaging in sexual relations with a patient has been
recognized as a basis for imposing liability on therapists.9 The
84. 38 Wash. App. 376, 685 P.2d 635 (1984).
85. Fiduciary relationships arise "when one person places trust in the faithful integrity of another,
who as a result gains superiority or influence over the first .... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 640
(7th ed. 1999). Fiduciary relationships entail "a duty to act with the highest degree of honesty and
loyalty toward another person and in the best interests of the other person .
Id. at 523. See also
I..."
Flannigan, The Fiduciary Obligation, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 285, 286-97 (1989) (analyzing the
trust-based nature of the fiduciary relationship).
86. Oner, 38 Wash. App. at 378, 685 P.2d at 637. See also Hoopes v. Hammargren, 725 P.2d
238, 242 (Nev. 1986) (noting that all physicians, including those practicing psychiatry, have a
fiduciary relationship with their patients); Eckhardt v. Charter Hosp. of Albuquerque, 953 P.2d 722,
727-28 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that non-physician mental health counselors owe their patients
a fiduciary duty of confidentiality); Hunter v. Brown, 4 Wash. App. 899, 905, 484 P.2d 1162 (1971)
(characterizing the relationship between physician and patient as fiduciary).
87. Onier, 38 Wash. App. at 378, 685 P.2d at 636 (summarizing the rationale of the New York
Court of Appeals in Roy v. Hartogs, 366 N.Y.S.2d 297, 299-301(N.Y. 1975)).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 379, 685 P.2d at 637 (quoting the New York Court of Appeals in Roy, 366 N.Y.S.2d at
301).
90. Benavidez v. United States, 177 F.3d 927, 930 (10th Cir. 1999).
91. See Patel v. Himalayan Int'l Inst., CV-94-1118, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22532, at *45 (M.D.
Pa. Dec. 9, 1999). See also Corgan v. Juehling, 522 N.E.2d 153, 156-57 (I1. 1988) (citing cases
recognizing malpractice where therapists have sexual relations with patients); St. Paul Fire & Mar.
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foreseeability of transference transforms what would otherwise be an
intentional tort into an action for negligence. Division I of the
Washington Court of Appeals explained in an unpublished opinion that
intentional sexual misconduct by therapists constitutes professional
negligence subject to coverage by malpractice insurance, "even though
similar contact between other professionals and their clients would be
excluded by malpractice insurance as an intentional tort ... because

therapists, unlike doctors and other professionals, have to deal with
transference as an aspect of the course of treatment. 92
Washington courts have relied on the distinctive characteristics of
transference to distinguish between imposing liability on malpractice
insurers of therapists who have sexual relationships with their patients
and insurers of other professionals who have sexual relationships with
their clients. In Washington Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Hicks,93
Division I of the Washington Court of Appeals relied on the distinction
made in Simmons between the duty of therapists toward clients and that
of other professionals,94 in holding that a malpractice policy did not
cover an insured chiropractor for sexual contact with the plaintiff during
a visit to the chiropractor's office for treatment. 95 The court noted that the
lack of transference in normal chiropractic care placed the chiropractor's
sexual misconduct beyond the norms of standard professional practice,
and therefore outside the realm of insured acts. 96 Similarly, in Standard
Ins. Co. v. Love, 459 N.W.2d 698, 701 (Minn. 1990) (holding transference gives rise to therapist
duty to refrain from personal relationship with patient during or outside therapy); MacClements v.
LaFone, 408 S.E.2d 878, 880 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (noting sexual intimacy between therapist and
patient constitutes malpractice or gross negligence); Damaby v. Davis, 57 P.3d 100, 103 (Okla. Civ.
App. 2002) (noting many courts recognize a cause of action against therapists who engage in sexual
acts with patients); Sisson v. Seneca Mental Health Council, 404 S.E.2d 425, 429 (W. Va. 1991)
(listing jurisdictions where therapist sexual contact with patient constitutes malpractice); see also C.
Katherine Mann & John D. Winer, Medical Negligence. Psychotherapists Sexual Contact With
Client, in 14 AM JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 319 (2002); Brendan de R. O'Byme, Annotation, Civil
Liability of Doctor or Psychologist for Having Sexual Relationship With Patient, 33 A.L.R. 3d 1393
(1970).
92. Lavalley v. Ritchie, No. 42251-1-1, 1999 Wash. App. LEXIS 933, at *7-8 (1999). But see
Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Cohen, 124 Wash. 2d 865, 872, 881 P.2d 1001, 1006 (1994) (reserving
judgment as to whether sexual misconduct by psychologists constitutes malpractice). While
negligence will lie in an action against a therapist, Washington courts tum to the intentional nature
of the sexual relationship to remove it from the sphere of employer liability. See infra notes 122131, 187-196 and accompanying text.
93. 49 Wash. App. 623, 744 P.2d 625 (1987).
94. See supra note 67-68 and accompanying text.
95. Hicks, 49 Wash. App. at 627, 744 P.2d at 627.
96. Id. at 627-28, 744 P.2d at 627.
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Fire Insurance Co. v. Blakeslee,97 Division II of the Washington Court of
Appeals held that a dentist's intentional sexual assault of a patient while
the patient was in a semiconscious state induced by nitrous oxide was not
covered under the dentist's professional liability policy. 98 The court
followed Hicks' lead by excluding from malpractice coverage sexual
contact not necessitated by the particular course of medical treatment.99
Although therapists may be found liable for the exploitation of
transference, victims of sexually exploitative therapists face difficulty
recovering damages directly from therapists because of exclusionary
clauses in therapists' malpractice policies. A patient's ability to initiate a
suit against a sexually exploitative therapist generally depends on finding
an attorney willing to undertake such a suit on a contingent fee basis. °°
However, the availability of monetary relief is limited. Uninsured
therapists are virtually judgment-proof.'0 ' Although courts have held that
sexual exploitation of transference constitutes a professional breach of
duty that is subject to coverage under malpractice insurance, 0 2 many
insurance companies specifically exclude coverage for sexual
misconduct from their professional malpractice policies. 10 3 Courts in
other jurisdictions have upheld these exclusionary clauses for sexual
misconduct and denied relief to plaintiffs that alleged the misuse of
transference in malpractice claims,0 4 and Washington courts have
97. 54 Wash. App. 1,771 P.2d 1172 (1989).
98. Id. at 11,771 P.2dat 1177.
99. Id. at 9,771 P.2d at 1176.
100. Larry H. Strasburger, "There Oughta Be A Law:" Criminalization of PsychotherapistPatient Sex as a Social Policy Dilemma, in PHYSICIAN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 19, 20 (Joseph D.
Bloom et al. eds., 1999).
101. Alan A. Stone & Duncan C. MacCourt, Insurance Coverage for Undue Familiarity, in
PHYSICIAN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 37, 38 (Joseph D. Bloom et al. eds., 1999).
102. See Snyder v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 789 F. Supp. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting the
majority rule is that "sexual contact is not a medical incident for insurance purposes unless the
physician is a psychiatrist and the sexual incident arises out of a therapeutic relationship."); R.W. v.
Schrein, 652 N.W.2d 574, 581 (Neb. 2002) (noting majority of jurisdictions limit malpractice
coverage for therapist sexual contact to mishandling of transference phenomenon).
103. See generally BISBING, supra note 28, at 910-13; Stone & MacCourt, supra note 101, 3788; Christopher Vaeth, Annotation, Coverage of Professional-Liability or Indemnity Policy for
Sexual Contact with Patients by Physicians Surgeons, and Other Healers, 60 A.L.R. 5th 239
(1998); Linda Jorgenson et al., Therapist-PatientSexual Exploitation and Insurance Liability, 27
TORT& INS. L.J. 595 (1992).
104. BISBING, supra note 28, at 911. See, e.g., Govar v. Chi. Ins. Co., 879 F.2d 1581, 1582-83
(8th Cir. 1989) (finding no insurer liability for damages arising out of therapist-patient sexual
relationship where professional liability policy excluded claims arising out of sexual acts); Chi. Ins.
Co. v. Griffin, 817 F. Supp. 861, 865-66 (D. Haw. 1993) (holding malpractice policy exclusion for
"sexual contact" excludes from coverage insurer liability for therapist's sexual relationship with
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followed suit."°5 As a consequence, plaintiffs have sought redress from
therapists' employers. ]16

B.

Washington Courts Use the "Scope of Employment" Test to Limit
Vicarious Employer Liabilityfor the Sexual Misconduct of Tortious
Therapists

Under the vicarious liability theory of respondeat superior, employers
are held strictly liable for the tortious act of their employees.'0 7 The
nature of respondeat superior liability varies by jurisdiction.' Generally,
respondeat superior liability makes employers "stand good" for the
wrongs committed by their employees.0 9 To ensure that liability is
imposed fairly, courts have limited the sphere of employer liability to
harm posed by an employee's conduct when acting "within the scope
of... employment." ' " Defining what conduct falls within the scope of
employment is notoriously difficult,"' and jurisdictions are divided as to
patient); Chi. Ins. Co. v. Manterola, 955 P.2d 982, 984-87 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding
exclusion under professional liability policy for therapist behavior that "threatened, led to or
culminated in any sexual act").
105. See, e.g., Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Cohen, 124 Wash. 2d 865, 871, 881 P.2d 1001, 1005
(1994) (holding insurer may provide lesser coverage for psychologist's sexual misconduct than for
nonsexual misconduct); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. NW Youth Servs., 97 Wash. App. 226, 232, 983
P.2d 1144, 1148 (1999) (holding therapist sexual relationship with patient within professional
liability policy exclusion for acts outside scope of employment).
106. Jorgenson et al., supra note 103, at 597, 600 n.33.
107. See DOBBS, supranote 80, at 905.
108. See BISBING, sutpra note 28, at 181-82.
109. DOBBS, supra note 80, at 906.
110. Id. at 910. An alternative approach to respondeat superior liability is the theory of jobcreated authority, which supports employers absorbing as a foreseeable business expense any harm
made peculiarly possible by the nature of the employment. See id. at 914. See also Rochelle Weber,
Note, Scope of Employment Redefined: Holding Employers Vicariously LiableJbr Sexual Assaults
Committed by Their Employees, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1513, 1533 (1992):
People are rarely employed to commit torts, but employers may put employees in positions
where they can do so. For example, employing a therapist who will use transference, which
places the patient in a vulnerable position, necessarily entails the danger of misuse and therefore
should be considered a cost of doing business.
Washington courts have consistently rejected the job-created authority theory as a form of enterprise
liability. See, e.g., Niece v. Elmview Group Home, 131 Wash. 2d 39, 52-59, 929 P.2d 420, 428-31
(1997) (holding vicarious employer liability for sexual assault committed by employee inappropriate
in absence of clear legislative intent); Kuehn v. White, 24 Wash. App. 274, 279-80, 600 P.2d 679,
682-83 (1979) (noting, in absence of legislation, no employer liability for employee's intentional
tortious or criminal acts committed outside scope of employment).
11. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, TORTS § 70, at 460 (4th ed. 1971) ("This highly indefinite
[language] which sometimes is varied with 'in the course of the employment,' is so devoid of
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whether intentional sexual misconduct falls within a therapist's scope of
employment. "'
In Washington, the doctrine of respondeat superior provides that the
employer" 3 is liable for the acts of an employee committed within the
scope or in the course of employment." 4 The general test for determining
whether an employee is acting in the scope of employment is whether the
15
employee is engaged in the furtherance of the employer's interest."

meaning in itself that its very vagueness has been of value in permitting a desirable degree of
flexibility in decisions.").
112. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding therapist
sexual relationship with patient within scope of employment); Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr.,
791 P.2d 344, 349 n.9 (Ala. 1990), modified, Veco, Inc. v. Rosebrock, 970 P.2d 906, 924 n.36 (Ala.
1999) (holding therapist's sexual contact with patient within scope of employment); Marston v.
Minn. Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, Ltd., 329 N.W.2d 306, 311 (Minn. 1982) (holding whether
therapist's sexual relation with patient within scope of employment was a question of fact); Plummer
v. Ctr. Psychiatrists, Ltd., 476 S.E.2d 172, 175 (Va. 1996) (holding whether therapist's sexual
exploitation during treatment within scope of employment was a question of fact). But see, e.g., P.S.
v. Psychiatric Coverage, Ltd., 887 S.W.2d 622, 625 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding therapist sexual
relations with patient outside scope of employment even where sexual misconduct occurs during or
in connection with therapy); Cosgrove v. Lawrence, 520 A.2d 844, 848-49 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1986) (holding therapist sexual misconduct outside scope of employment even where
motivation is to promote therapy); Noto v. St. Vincent's Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 559 N.Y.S.2d 510, 511
(N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (holding sexual misconduct of psychiatrist outside scope of employment);
Block v. Gomez, 549 N.W. 2d 783 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (holding therapist sexual relationship with
patient outside scope of employment because not motivated by purpose to serve employer); Birkner
v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1058 (Utah 1989) (holding therapist sexual contact with patient
outside scope of employment because not intended to further employer interest). See generally Paul
A. Clark, Applying Respondeat Superior to Psychotherapist-Patient Sexual Relationships, 21 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 439 (1997); Adrian Tabangay, Scope of Employment, Sex and Transference: When Ls
an Employer Liable for Therapist Sexual Relations?, 28 J. HEALTH & HosP. L. 108 (1995); Adam A.
Milani, Patient Assaults: Health Care Providers Owe a Non-Delegable Duty to Their Patients and
Should be Held Strictly Liable for Employee Assaults Whether or Not Within the Scope of
Employment, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1147 (1995); Linda M. Jorgenson et al., Tranference of
Liability: Employer Liabilityfor Sexual Misconduct by Therapists, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1421 (1995);
Christine W. Young, Respondeat Superior: A Clarification and Broadening of the Current "Scope of
Employment" Test, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 599 (1990).
113. Employers are "masters" and employees "servants" for purposes of the traditional terms of
respondeat superior. See DOBBS, supra note 80, at 905.
114. See Niece, 131 Wash. 2d at 48, 929 P.2d at 425-26; Dickenson v. Edwards, 105 Wash. 2d
457, 466, 716 P.2d 814, 819 (1986).
115. Dickenson, 105 Wash. 2d at 467, 716 P.2d at 819. The issue of whether a particular
employee is engaged in furtherance of the employer's interest is often one for the trier of fact, as in
the example of a messenger who negligently injures someone while driving back to work from a
baseball game. See DOBBS, supra note 80, at 912.
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Thus, an employer can be liable for an employee's intentional sexual
6
misconduct if it is committed in pursuit of the employer's business."
Washington courts have been reluctant to find that an employee's
intentional sexual misconduct was motivated by a desire to further the
employer's interest, and therefore have held that the misconduct was
outside the employee's scope of employment." 7 This position is in
opposition to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' earlier interpretation of
Washington law." 8 Applying Washington law, the Ninth Circuit held in
Simmons v. United States"19 that a counselor was acting within the scope
of employment when he engaged in a long-term sexual relationship with
a client. 2 ° The court reasoned that because the sexual relationship arose
from the counselor's mishandling of transference, a phenomenon arising
within the scope of the employee's duties, the employer was liable under
121
Washington agency law.

However, Washington courts have rejected Simmons as a basis for
imposing liability on the employers of tortious employees. Division I of
the Washington Court of Appeals expressly rejected Simmons in
Thompson v. Everett Clinic.2 2 In Thompson, the plaintiff sued a clinic
where he had been sexually assaulted by a physician during a physical
23
examination, bringing his claim under a theory of respondeat superior., 4
2
The Thompson court applied the intentionality rule of Kuehn v. White,
that a servant's intentionally tortious or criminal acts will not be
attributed to the employer "even though the employment situation
provided the opportunity for the servant's wrongful acts or the means for
carrying them out."'2 5 The Thompson court interpreted Kuehn to mean
that "a tort committed by an agent, even if committed while engaged in
the employment of the principal, is not attributable to the principal if it
emanated from a wholly personal motive of the agent and was done to
116. Henderson v. Pennwalt Corp., 41 Wash. App. 547, 552, 704 P.2d 1256, 1260-61 (1985)

(holding employer liable if wrongful sexual act performed in furtherance of employer's interest).
117. See infra notes 122-131 and accompanying text.
118. In federal court, state law determines whether a federal employee's act is within the scope of
employment for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act. Pelletier v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of S.F.,
968 F.2d 865, 876 (9th Cir. 1992).
119. 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986).
120. Id. at 1369.
121. Id. at 1369 (citing Smith v. Leber, 34 Wash. 2d 611,623,209 P.2d 297, 303 (1949)).
122. 71 Wash. App. 548, 553, 860 P.2d 1054, 1057-58 (1993).
123. Id. at 550, 860 P.2d at 1056.
124. 24 Wash. App. 274, 600 P.2d 679 (1979).
125. Id. at 278, 600 P.2d at 682.
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gratify solely personal objectives or desires of the agent."' 26 Thus, the
court held that the clinic was not liable for the physician's misconduct
because it was a wholly personal and27 intentional act that was not done in
furtherance of the clinic's business. 1
In Lavalley v. Ritchie,128 an unpublished opinion of Division I of the
Washington Court of Appeals, the court relied on Kuehn and rejected
Simmons in holding that a therapist's sexual relationship with a client
initiated during therapy was beyond the scope of employment because it
was not furthering the purpose of the employer. 29 In reaffirming its
earlier rejection of Simmons, the court noted that the therapist's "wholly
personal motive" in the relationship with his patient was "too far
removed from his counseling duties" to warrant imposing respondeat
superior liability on his employer. 3 Washington courts have focused on
the presence of a personal motivation to generally exclude
employers
3
from liability for the sexual misconduct of their employees.1 '
While Washington courts have not distinguished between therapist
employees and other employees in determining employer liability for
sexual misconduct, courts in other jurisdictions have held employers of
sexually exploitative therapists liable under a scope of employment test
on the theory that the exploitation was a foreseeable risk in the nature of
therapy. The Supreme Court of Minnesota held in Marston v.
Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry 32 that the test for whether an
employee's act is within the scope of employment should be a factual
one, based on both foreseeability and whether the act bore a relation to or
was connected with acts otherwise within the scope of employment.'33 In
126. Thompson, 71 Wash. App. at 553, 860 P.2d at 1058.
127. Id. at 554, 860 P.2d at 1058. Accord Doe v. Swift, 570 So.2d 1209, 1213 (Ala. 1990)

(holding personal motivation placed therapist's sexual acts beyond scope of employment); Dausch v.
Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1428 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding sexual acts for therapist's personal benefit and
thus beyond scope of employment).
128. No. 42251-1-1, 1999 Wash. App. LEXIS 933 (1999).
129. Id. at *10.
130. Id. at *8-10.

131. See, e.g., Bratton v. Calkins, 73 Wash. App. 492, 500-01, 870 P.2d 981, 986 (1994) (holding
teacher's sexual relationship with student beyond scope of employment because motivated by
personal desires). The Washington State Supreme Court did not distinguish between therapists and

other professionals when it concluded that "neither current Washington case law nor considerations
of public policy favor the imposition of respondeat superior or strict liability for an employee's

intentional sexual misconduct." C.J.C. v. Corp. of the Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 138 Wash. 2d
699, 718-19, 985 P.2d 262, 272 (1999).
132. 329 N.W.2d 306 (Minn. 1983).
133. Id. at 311.
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Doe v. United States,134 a federal district court in the Eastern District of
Virginia reasoned that a psychologist's sexual exploitation of a patient
under hypnosis was foreseeable and therefore within the psychologist's
scope of employment, given the increasing public awareness of the
ethical edicts prohibiting therapist sexual exploitation of clients.'35 And
the Supreme Court of California recognized, in Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo
Newhall Memorial Hospital,136 that sexual relations resulting from the
mishandling of transference may be a foreseeable intentional tort for
which an employer may be liable under a theory of vicarious liability.'37
In sum, Washington courts have rejected imposing vicarious liability
on employers for an employee's intentional sexual misconduct.'38 This
distinguishes Washington courts from courts in other jurisdictions that
have determined the scope of employer liability based on the
foreseeability of the risk of an abuse of transference.' However, in the
absence of respondeat superior liability, employers may be held liable for
acts of employee sexual misconduct under two theories of direct
employer negligence. The sources of direct employer liability for the
sexual misconduct of employees are duties that arise out of (1) a special
relationship with a party whose well-being has been entrusted to the
employer, or (2) the employer's negligent supervision of the employee. 4 '
An employer's liability for the breach of these duties is "analytically
distinct and separate from" respondeat superior liability, 4 ' and is not
limited by the scope of employment test.'42
C.

Washington Courts Have Been Unwilling to Recognize a "Special
Relationship" Between Patients and Therapists' Employers

Under Washington law, an employer has a duty to make reasonable
efforts to protect parties with whom it stands in a "special relationship"
from foreseeable harm caused by employees' intentional or criminal

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

912 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Va. 1995).
Id. at 194-95.
907 P.2d 358 (Cal. 1995).
See id. at 365.
See supranotes 122-131 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 132-137 and accompanying text.
Niece v. Elmview Group Home, 131 Wash. 2d 39, 48-53, 929 P.2d 420, 426-28 (1997).
Id. at 48, 929 P.2d at 426.
Id.
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conduct.'43 This duty, based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315,
represents an exception to the general rule that one has no legal duty to
protect others from the intentional or criminal acts of third parties. 4 In
the case of the patients of therapists, a special relationship can arise from
either the employer's duty to control therapists' actions toward patients,
or from a right of protection owed patients by employers. 115
Washington courts have recognized the existence of a special
relationship when one party has entrusted its well-being to another and as
a consequence has become particularly vulnerable. In Funkhouser v.
Wilson, 4 6 Division I of the Washington Court of Appeals noted that the
special relationship between a hospital or nursing home and its patients is

based on the vulnerability of the physically or mentally ill and their
inability to care for themselves.' 47 The court identified multiple factors to
consider when determining whether the vulnerability created by
entrustment gives rise to a legal duty of protection:
[T]he balancing of the societal interests involved, the severity of
the risk, the burden upon the defendant, the likelihood of
occurrence, the relationship between the parties, the temptation

presented by the act or failure to act, the gravity of the harm that
may result, and the possibility that some other person will assume
the responsibility for preventing the conduct or the harm, together
with the burden of the precautions which the actor would be

required to take.' 4 8
The special relationships recognized to date by Washington courts
include those between a school and its students, 49 an innkeeper and its
guests, 50 a common carrier and its passenger,' 5 ' an employer and its
143. Petersen v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 421, 426, 671 P.2d 230, 236 (1983) (adopting rule of
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965)).

144. Hutchins v. 1001 Fourth Ave. Ass'ns, 116 Wash. 2d 217, 223, 802 P.2d 1360, 1364 (1991).
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315. General Principle:

There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing
physical harm to another unless (a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third
person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or (b) a special
relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right to protection.
146. 89 Wash. App. 644, 950 P.2d 501 (1998), aff'd on other grounds, 138 Wash. 2d 699, 985
P.2d 262 (1999).
147. Id. at 660, 950 P.2d at 509.
148. Id. at 661, 950 P.2d at 509.
149. McLeod v. Grant Sch. Dist., 42 Wash. 2d 316, 319-20, 255 P.2d 360, 362-63 (1953).
150. Miller v. Staton, 58 Wash. 2d 879, 883, 365 P.2d 333, 335 (1961).
151. Marks v. Ala. S.S. Co., 71 Wash. 167, 169-70, 127 P. 1101, 1101-02 (1912).
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employee,' 52 a hospital and its patient,153 a business establishment and the55
customer, 54 a group home and its developmentally disabled residents,
and a church and vulnerable persons within the custody of its workers or
volunteers. "'5
The duty imposed on an employer by its special relationship with third
parties is broader than the duty imposed by the scope of employment
test. The special relationship that arises from entrustment gives potential
victims a right to protection from third parties even in the absence of a
custodial or continuous relationship between the caregiver and the
victim. 57 The caregiver's duty to protect potential victims extends to
foreseeable injuries, even if perpetrated off the premises or outside
working hours.'58 Furthermore, because the "duty is limited only by the
concept of foreseeability,' ' 59 it includes intentional or criminal sexual
misconduct. 60 Under Washington law, intentional or criminal sexual
misconduct "may be foreseeable unless it is 'so highly extraordinary or
improbable as to be wholly beyond the range of expectability""' and is
"within the general field of danger which should have been
anticipated." 62
Washington courts have held employers liable for their employees'
sexual misconduct where a special relationship existed between the
victim and the employer. In Niece v. Elmview Group Home,' 63 the
plaintiff, a developmentally disabled woman, sued a nursing home where
she had suffered a sexual assault by a male employee. 64 The Supreme
152. Bartlett v. Hantover, 9 Wash. App. 614, 620-21, 513 P.2d 844, 848-49 (1973), revd on
other grounds, 84 Wash.2d 426, 526 P.2d 1217 (1974).
153. Hunt v. King County, 4 Wash. App. 14, 19-20, 481 P.2d 593, 597, review denied, 79 Wash.

2d 1001 (1971).
154. Nivens v. 7-11 Hoagy's Comer, 133 Wash. 2d 192, 202-03, 943 P.2d 286, 291-92 (1997).
155. Niece v. Elmview Group Home, 131 Wash. 2d 39, 5I, 929 P.2d 420, 427 (1997).
156. C.J.C. v. Corp. of the Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 138 Wash. 2d 699, 724-26, 985 P.2d 262,
275-76 (1999).
157. Taggart v. State, 118 Wash. 2d 195,223-24, 822 P.2d 243, 257 (1992).
158. C.J.C., 138 Wash. 2d at 727, 985 P.2d at 277.
159. Niece, 131 Wash. 2d at 50, 929 P.2d at 427.
160. Compare id. at 50-52, 929 P.2d at 426-48, with supra notes 122-126 and accompanying
text (discussing cases that preclude employer liability for an employee's intentional or criminal
misconduct when issuing from wholly personal motives).
161. Niece, 131 Wash. 2d at 50, 929 P.2d at 427 (quoting Johnson v. State, 77 Wash. App. 934,

942, 894 P.2d 1366, 1371 (1995)).
162. Id.
163. 131 Wash. 2d 39, 929 P.2d 420 (1997).
164. Id. at 41. 929 P.2d at 422.
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Court of Washington held that the sexual assault was foreseeable within
the "general field of danger which should have been anticipated. ' '165 The
court determined that the group home had a duty to prevent sexual
assault because of the special relationship between the group home and
its vulnerable residents. 166 Intentional or criminal sexual misconduct
satisfied the test under Washington law for foreseeable harm because it
was not extraordinary or improbable enough to be wholly beyond the
range of expectability. 167 In a later case, the court imposed liability on a
defendant church for sexual misconduct that occurred beyond the church
premises and outside working hours because of the special relationship
68
between the church and the children entrusted to its care.
However, Division I of the Washington Court of Appeals declined to
find a special relationship between an employer and the victim of an
employee counselor's sexual misconduct in S.H.C. v. Lu. 169 The plaintiff
in S.H.C. claimed that the defendant temple breached its fiduciary duty to
her when its priest used sexual therapy. 7 ° Although S.H.C. asserted that
she was vulnerable because she was devoted to the sexually exploitative
priest, the court reasoned that S.H.C. was not a "particularly vulnerable"
victim as required to invoke a special relationship.'"' The court did not
consider the phenomenon of transference, nor did it explain why S.H.C.
was not sufficiently vulnerable to merit a special relationship; it resolved
the issue on the basis of a lack of available Washington precedent.'72
Conversely, courts in other jurisdictions have held that a special
relationship exists between the employer of a sexually exploitative
therapist and his victim. In Grzan v. Charter Hospital of Northwest
Indiana,"3 an Indiana Court of Appeals held that the victim of a
therapist's alleged mishandling of transference could seek redress from
the employing hospital. 7 4 The court determined that the employer owed
the victim a direct duty of care where the therapist was acting outside the

165. Id. at 50, 929 P.2d at 427.
166. Id.
167. Id
168. C.J.C. v. Corp. of the Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 138 Wash. 2d 699, 727, 985 P.2d 262,
276-77 (1999).
169. 113 Wash. App. 511,524-28, 54 P.3d 174, 180-82 (2002).
170. Id. at 524-27, 54 P.3d at 180-81.
171. Id. at 525-26, 54 P.3d at 181.
172. Id.
173. 702 N.E.2d 786 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
174. Id. at 793-94.
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scope of his employment. 75 And in Richard H. v. Larry D.,' 76 a
California appellate court held that a sexually exploitative therapist's
breach of professional and fiduciary duties toward his patient was also
actionable against the hospital where he was employed. 77 According to
one legal commentator, the court implied in dicta that the hospital owed
the patient a direct fiduciary duty because the therapist was acting on its
178
behalf.
In sum, the special relationship doctrine imposes upon employers a
direct duty to protect from sexual misconduct vulnerable parties who
have entrusted their well-being to the employers.7 9 While courts in other
jurisdictions have been willing to impose a direct duty of patient care on
employers of sexually exploitive therapists,' 80 the S.H.C. court declined
to hold a religious therapist's employer liable on the basis of the special
relationship doctrine. 8'
D.

Washington Courts Limit Direct Employer Liabilityfor Negligent
Supervision to Employers' Ability to Reasonably Foreseethe Risk
of Harm Posed to Patients by ParticularTherapists

Patients can bring suit against employers for negligent supervision of
sexually exploitative therapists independent of any direct duty owed
them by virtue of a special relationship. 8 2 Under the theory of negligent
supervision, employers may be liable for acts committed outside an
employee's scope of employment.' 83 In Washington, the theory of
negligent supervision for acts committed outside an employee's scope of
employment is based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317.184
175. Id.

176.
177.
178.
n.186.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

243 Cal. Rptr. 807 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
Id. at 810.
See discussion of Richard H., 243 Cal. Rptr. 807, in BISBING, supra note 28, at 217-18
See supra notes 143-62 and accompanying text.
See sutpra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
See supro notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
See infra note 184.
See info' note 184.

184. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 317 (1965). Duty of Master to Control Conduct of

Servant:
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his servant while acting
outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him from intentionally harming others or
from so conducting himself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if (a) the
servant (i) is upon the premises in possession of the master or upon which the servant is
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Washington employers have a limited duty to supervise an employee's
conduct outside the scope of employment where the employer knows or.
'
should know of "the dangerous tendencies of the particular employee."185
Generally, Washington courts have been reluctant to impose liability on
employers for the intentionally tortious
acts of their employees where
186
those acts involve sexual misconduct.
Washington courts thus far have held that any harm caused in nontherapeutic settings by an employee's sexual relationship could not have
been foreseen in the normal performance of the employee's duties. In
Scott v. Blanchet,'87 plaintiffs appealed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in a suit against a teacher, high school, and archdiocese for
damages resulting from a sexual relationship between the plaintiffs'
daughter and her high school teacher. 88 Division I of the Washington
Court of Appeals held that there was no evidence that the teacher was
acting in his official capacity at the time of the sexual activities, and that
the school lacked any advance knowledge of the particular teacher's
proclivities.' 89 Consequently, the parents could not recover against the
high school or archdiocese on the basis of respondeat superior or for
negligent hiring and supervision of the teacher.'9" Similarly, in Peck v.
Siau,'9' Division II of the Washington Court of Appeals held that a
school was not responsible for a teacher's sexual relations with a student,
even though another teacher knew about the relationship.' 92 The court
reasoned that the school was not liable because the second teacher
had no
19 3
hiring or supervision authority over the exploitative teacher.
Similarly, Washington courts to date have refused to hold the
employers of sexually exploitative therapists liable under a theory of
negligent supervision. In an unpublished opinion, Division I of the
Washington Court of Appeals declined in Lavalley v. Ritchie'94 to impose
privileged to enter only as his servant, or (ii) is using a chattel of the master, and (b) the master
(i) knows or has reason toknow that he has the ability to control his servant, and (ii) knows or
should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.
185. Niece v. Elmview Group Home, 131 Wash. 2d 39, 52, 929 P.2d 420, 427-28 (1997).
186. See infra notes 187-97 and accompanying text.
187. 50 Wash. App. 37, 747 P.2d 1124 (1987).
188. Id.at 38, 747 P.2d at 1125.
189. Id.at 41-44, 747 P.2d at 1127-28.
190. Id.
at 43-44, 47, 747 P.2d at 1128, 1130.
191. 65 Wash. App. 285, 827 P.2d 1108 (1992).
192. Id.at 287, 289-90, 827 P.2d at 1109, 1110-11.
193. Id.at 290-92, 827 P.2d at 1111-12.
194. No. 42251-1-1, 1999 Wash. App. LEXIS 933 (1999).
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liability on the employer of a sexually exploitative therapist even though
the employer had some knowledge of the rumored affair, the therapist
was living with the patient, and the therapist listed the patient's address
and phone number as his own.'95 The court held that the therapist's
workplace discussions about his relationship did not identify the client in
sufficient detail to inform the employer of the existence of an improper
relationship.' 96 Recently, when faced with the question whether employer
knowledge of employee sexual misconduct was sufficient to establish
employer liability, Division I of the Washington Court of Appeals
refused to rule on the issue in S.H.C., holding that on the facts of that
case it was barred by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment.' 97 Given the questionable precedential value of the
unpublished Lavalley opinion and the court's recent refusal to reach the
merits of the negligent supervision claim, it is unclear how other
Washington courts would decide the issue.
However, courts in other jurisdictions have imposed a duty on
employers to supervise against therapist sexual misconduct, based on the
foreseeability of harm arising from the transference phenomenon. The
Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia, in Morgan v. Psychiatric
Institute of Washington,'"8 reversed a grant of summary judgment to an
employer in an action for negligent supervision, hiring and training.'9 9
The court held that the victim's damages from the employee therapist's
exploitation of transference were foreseeable and the evidence of injury
was sufficient to withstand summary judgment."' 0 Similarly, in Nelson v.
Gillette,20 ' the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that "the known risk
of improperly handling the occurrence of transference," when coupled
with knowledge of the promiscuous sexual history of a developmentally
disabled victim, may constitute a cause of action for negligent
supervision against the employer of a therapist.2 2 The court noted that
"[a]ll counseling relationships can be affected by the transference
phenomenon."2 3
195. Id. at * 12-16.

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at *14.
S.H.C. v. Lu, 113 Wash. App. at 523-24, 54 P.3d at 180.
692 A.2d417 (D.C. 1997).
Id. at 423.
Id.
571 N.W.2d 332 (N.D. 1997).
Id. at 342.
Id.at341.
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In sum, patients of sexually exploitative therapists have a difficult
time receiving redress directly from their therapists." 4 As a result,
patients seek compensation from the therapists' employers. 2 5 However,
Washington courts have not held employers liable for the conduct of
sexually exploitative therapists, finding the therapists' sexual misconduct
outside the scope of employment.20 6 Similarly, Washington courts have
refused to impose a duty of protection on employers arising from the
special relationship between the employer and the therapists' patients.20 7
Finally, Washington courts have held employers to a heightened duty of
supervision only where the sexual misconduct of a particular therapist
has been foreseeable to the employer.20 8
III. EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR THERAPIST SEXUAL
MISCONDUCT SHOULD BE EXPANDED BECAUSE OF THE
FORESEEABLE RISKS POSED TO PATIENTS BY THE
TRANSFERENCE PHENOMENON
The foreseeability of transference places therapist sexual misconduct
within existing Washington tests for employer liability. Respondeat
superior liability is satisfied because the risk of exploitation of
transference is foreseeable within the scope of a therapist's
employment. 0 9 Further, a special relationship exists between therapists'
employers and patients because the risk of therapist exploitation of
transference satisfies the factors from Funkhouser, is foreseeable within
the general field of danger, and is not wholly beyond the realm of
expectability." 0 Finally, the general foreseeability of sexual misconduct
should impose a duty on employers to supervise against therapist
exploitation of the transference phenomenon.2"'

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 122-31 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 187-97 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 211-30 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 231-51 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 252-64 and accompanying text.

Washington Law Review
A.

Vol. 78:525, 2003

The Abuse or Negligent Mishandling of TransferenceSatisfies the
Scope of Employment Test Because It Is a ForeseeableRisk of
Furtheringan Employer's Business

Full appreciation of the transference phenomenon provides a basis
under existing Washington law for holding employers liable for the
tortious sexual misconduct of their therapists. Washington courts should
find intentional sexual misconduct within the scope of employment if
such acts are performed in furtherance of the employer's business. 2 '
Other courts have found therapist exploitation of the transference
phenomenon sufficiently related to the pursuit of an employer's business
to fall within the scope of employment." 3 The Ninth Circuit's decision in
Simmons is particularly instructive, given that it interprets Washington
agency law to impose employer liability for a therapist's sexual
misconduct.2" 4 Confronting the issue of whether an abusive counselor's
actions were in furtherance of the employer's interest, the court noted
that "the centrality of transference to therapy renders it impossible to
separate an abuse of transference from the treatment itself."2 5 The court
also noted that "a sexual relationship between therapist and patient
cannot be viewed separately from the therapeutic relationship that has
developed between them. 2 16 Where the employee's unauthorized acts
are performed in conjunction with acts that the employee is instructed to
perform, Washington agency law imposes respondeat superior
7
21

liability.

In both its Thompson and Lavalley opinions, Division I of the
Washington Court of Appeals neglected to consider the unique dynamics
of transference in failing to apply the theory of vicarious employer
liability of Simmons.1 8 In Thompson, the court ruled on allegations of
sexual abuse by a physician whose motive it held to be wholly
personal. 1 9 In the unpublished Lavalley opinion, the court held that a
212. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text; Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791
P.2d 344, 346 (Alaska 1990); modified, Veco, Inc. v. Rosebrock, 970 P.2d 906, 924 n.36 (Alaska
1999).
214. Simmons v. United States. 805 F.2d 1363, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1986).
215. Id. at 1370.
216. Id. (quoting L.L. v. Med. Protective Co., 362 N.W.2d 174, 178 (Wis. App. 1984)).
217. Smith v. Leber, 34 Wash. 2d 611, 623, 209 P.2d 297, 303 (1949). See supra notes 115-21
and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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therapist's sexual relationship with a patient during therapy was beyond
the scope of employment because it determined the therapist's motive to
be wholly personal.220 But Simmons premised employer liability on a
careful analysis of the dynamics of transference in the context of
therapy.221 Neither the Thompson nor Lavalley courts adequately
examined the intricate interrelation between a therapist's normal duties
and the abuse of transference.222 Yet, when imposing direct liability on
tortious therapists, Washington courts have recognized that transference
poses unique and foreseeable risks of harm to the therapists' patients.223
Thus, the Thompson and Lavalley courts should have considered how
personal motivation is related to an employee's expected job duties in the
unique context of transference. The Thompson and Lavalley courts'
summary rejection of employer liability in the presence of an employee's
personal motive is in conflict with those courts in other jurisdictions that
have held employers of tortious therapists liable under the theory of
respondeat superior regardless of personal motive.224
Because abuse or negligent mishandling of transference is a risk
inherent to the therapeutic relationship, such conduct should qualify as a
foreseeable risk in the normal furtherance of the employer's business.
The abuse or negligent mishandling of transference originates in the
power created by the therapeutic relationship.225 It is the transference
phenomenon itself that renders the patient particularly vulnerable.226
When conducting therapy, a therapist employee is seeking to further the
interest of the employer; sexual misconduct that occurs in the therapeutic
setting is "best understood as inextricably related to the dynamics of the
'
therapeutic relationship."227
The foreseeability of the abuse or
mishandling of transference should be considered a predictable result of

220. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text.
222. The Lavalley court rejected any theory of employer liability premised on a foreseeable
consequence of the employer's activity as inconsistent with its decisions rejecting theories of
enterprise liability. Lavalley v. Ritchie, No. 42251-1-I, 1999 Wash. App. LEXIS 933, at *10 (1999).
See supra note I 0.

223. See supra notes 90-99 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 132-137 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
226. Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Employers Ins., 626 F. Supp. 262, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
227. St. Paul Fire & Mar. Ins. Co. v. Love, 459 N.W.2d 698, 702 (Minn. 1990). See also Am.
Home Assurance Co. v. Stone, 61 F.3d 1321, 1330 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting transference makes sexual
exploitation of patient inseparable from therapeutic relationship); Vigilant Ins. Co., 626 F. Supp. at
266 (noting the therapeutic relationship itself renders patient particularly vulnerable to therapist).
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the "relationship between the nature of the work involved and the type of
tort committed ....
"228
Transference inherently arises during a
therapist's pursuit of the employer's business, and it is therefore within
the scope of the therapist's employment.229 Washington courts should
follow the lead of other jurisdictions in recognizing that sexual
misconduct with a patient is an act that, for purposes of respondeat
superior liability, falls within the scope of a therapist's employment. 30
B.

The ForeseeableRisk that a Therapistwill Abuse Transference
Should Qualify Patientsfor a Special Relationship with the
Employer

The risks posed to victims of exploitative therapists are sufficiently
foreseeable to Warrant a duty arising from a special relationship between
victims and the employers or therapists. The unique vulnerability of
patients caught in the grips of transference satisfies the existing factors
for judicial recognition of a special relationship.2"3' Additionally, the
relationship between patients and the employers of therapists is directly
analogous to special relationships already recognized by Washington
courts.

232

Washington courts should recognize that a special relationship exists
between employers and therapists' patients under the Funkhouser
factors.233 The risk of mishandling transference is severe enough to make
such mishandling likely to occur, as indicated by empirical studies 234 and
professional prohibitions on sexual misconduct. 235 The same studies and
self-reports of therapists demonstrate that the temptation to exploit
228. John Y. Jr. v. Chaparral Treatment Ctr., Inc., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 330, 340 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)
(quoting Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem. Hosp., 907 P.2d 358, 364 (Cal. 1995)).
229. Love, 459 N.W.2d at 702 (noting that "sexual contact between therapist and patient arising
from the phenomenon may be viewed as the consequence of a failure to provide proper treatment of
the transference"); Mullen v. Horton, 700 A.2d 1377, 1381 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997) (holding therapist
sexual misconduct within scope of employment because represents "misguided effort" to serve
employer). But cf Block v. Gomez, 549 N.W.2d 783, 788 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (rejecting employer
liability premised on inseparability due to transference of patient treatment and therapist sexual
misconduct).
230. See supra notes 132-137 and accompanying text.
23 I. See ifra notes 234-243 and accompanying text.
232. See infra notes 244-251 and accompanying text.
233. Funkhouser v. Wilson, 89 Wash. App. 644, 661, 950 P.2d 501, 509 (1998). See supra notes
146-148 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
235. See supro note 66 and accompanying text.
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transference is great.236 The harm that may result from the abuse or
mishandling of transference can be devastating.237 Furthermore, there is a
social interest in enforcing the trust relationship238 between therapists and
their patients through employer liability. No other party is effectively
assuming the responsibility for compensating victims for their injuries.239
Employers are in a position to directly allocate to the beneficiaries of the
employer's services the business expense of damage awards,240 and
employers can be powerful agents in the prevention of therapist sexual
abuse. 241 Heightened employer liability creates a strong incentive for an
employer to exercise care in the training and supervising of its
employees.242 Finally, heightened employer liability is not so
burdensome as to significantly decrease the delivery of counseling
services, as demonstrated by the experience of those states that impose
employer civil liability by statute.24 3
The relationship between employers and their employee therapists'
patients is analogous to other relationships that Washington courts have
recognized as special relationships. The Funkhouser court noted that the
special relationship between a hospital or nursing home and its patients 44
is
2
ill.
mentally
or
physically
the
of
vulnerability
heightened
the
on
based
Washington courts should recognize that patients of sexually exploitative
therapists possess a special relationship with the therapist's employer for
the same reason, because the Omer court recognized that a mental health
patient's ability to consent to a sexual relationship with a therapist is
necessarily illusory. 245 Although the S.H.C. court rejected this position
where an adult female was sexually exploited by her religious
counselor,24 6 the court did not consider the plaintiffs vulnerability from
the standpoint of transference. Therapists' patients are vulnerable
236. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 100-105 and accompanying text.
240. Weber, supra note 110, at 1537.
241. BISBING, supra note 28, at 227.
242. Weber, supra note 110, at 1537.

243. See BISBING, supra note 28, at 223-27. Both Minnesota and Illinois impose statutory
employer civil liability if the employer knows or has reason to know that a therapist has sexually
exploited a current or former patient and fails to take appropriate and timely remedial action. ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 140/3 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148A.03 (West 1998).
244. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 171-172 and accompanying text.
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because the idealization of their therapists is inherent in effective
24 7
therapy.
Washington courts confronted with therapist sexual misconduct
should follow the example of the Niece court, which held that sexual
assault is foreseeable within the general field of danger that a group
home should anticipate when caring for vulnerable residents.248
Similarly, courts should recognize that the inherent nature of transference
and the frequency of its abuse make therapist sexual misconduct
foreseeable within the general field of danger that therapists' employers
should anticipate.249
Moreover, once Washington courts recognize the special relationship
between employers and therapists' patients, they should extend the duty
of protection arising from the special relationship beyond the normal
time and space limitations of the employer's premises.25° The
vulnerability of patients in the grips of transference warrants courts
extending the duty of protection employers owe to patients to harm
caused by sexual relations with therapists outside therapy sessions or off
the employer's premises.25 '
C.

Employers Should Assume a Duty of Care ForPurposes of
Negligent Supervision Because the Risk ofAbuse or Negligent
Mishandlingof Transference by Therapists is Generally
Foreseeable to Employers

Transference is a foreseeable phenomenon for any therapist because
transference is inherent in effective therapy. 2 Therapy patients are
uniquely vulnerable to therapist manipulation of transference. 253 The risk
of potential harm to patients is sufficiently foreseeable to make the
254
proper handling of transference a professional expectation of therapists
and for professional organizations to proscribe the exploitation of
transference in their ethical codes. 5
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 163-166 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 28-52 and accompanying text.
See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
See supa note 168 and accompanying text.
Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1365 (9th Cir. 1986).
See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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While the S.H.C. court held that imposing such a heightened
supervisory duty on a religious organization was barred by the First
Amendment,2 56 the duty should be imposed on employers of nonreligious
therapists. The Lavalley court refused to impose liability on the employer
of a sexually exploitative employee because the employer did not have
particular knowledge of the employee's misconduct.2 7 However,
Washington courts have formulated the requirement of particular
knowledge primarily within the context of relationships where
transference is not encouraged or expected to occur. 258 The Lavalley
court did not consider how the foreseeability of transference might
warrant imposing upon employers of therapists a heightened duty of
supervision. 259 Further, Division I of the Washington Court of Appeals
declined to publish the decision, thus it has questionable precedential
value.26 °
Washington courts confronting the issue in the future should follow
other jurisdictions in recognizing that the risk of sexual misconduct
posed by transference is sufficiently foreseeable to impose upon
employers a heightened duty of supervisory care. The abuse of
transference by therapists is foreseeable. 26' As courts in other
jurisdictions have recognized, the generalized risk of therapist sexual
misconduct is sufficient to impose a heightened duty of supervision on
employers, even in the absence of knowledge of any risk posed by a
particular employee.262 Where the risk of foreseeable harm to a patient is
coupled with recognition of the patient's vulnerability, other jurisdictions
have held that employers of therapists have a duty to effectively
supervise their employees. 263 As an inherent phenomenon in therapy,
transference can be easily abused or mishandled. 264 Thus, Washington
256. See supra note 9.
257. Lavalley v. Ritchie, No. 42251-1-1, 1999 Wash. App. LEXIS 933, at *12 (1999).
258 Both Scott and Peck involved teacher-student relationships. See supra notes 187-97 and
accompanying text. But cf BISBING, supra note 28, at 210 ("Similarities exist in the relationship

between a therapist and patient and that of a teacher and student. Both exercise power and authority
over, and are able to manipulate and control, vulnerable people in their care.").
259. Lavalley, 1999 Wash. App. LEXIS 933, at *12-16. In upholding summary judgment for the

employer on the negligent supervision claim, the Lavalley court only considered whether the
employer's explanation of transference to the patient upon leaming of the relationship after the
patient had ceased her therapy might have mitigated her damages. Id. at * 15-16.

260. Id. at *1.
261. See supra notes 90-99 and accompanying text.

262. See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.

264. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
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courts should impose a heightened duty on therapists' employers to
supervise against therapist sexual exploitation, even in the absence of
knowledge of a particular employee's misconduct.
IV. CONCLUSION
As modem society becomes increasingly characterized by
professional-client relations, the risk of harm caused by breaches of
professional duty increases proportionately. Unfortunately, the law has
been slow to accommodate the evolution of an increasingly fiduciary
society. In Washington, this is particularly apparent in the case of the
victims of therapist sexual exploitation.
The transference phenomenon is well-recognized in the fields of
psychoanalysis and law. The potential harm posed by transference to
clients of therapists is sufficiently established to serve as the basis for
direct liability on the part of sexually exploitative therapists. But despite
the inherent character of transference, courts have not applied the
doctrine of respondeat superior to the employers of therapists who
sexually exploit patients. Despite the unique vulnerability of patients
experiencing transference, Washington courts have held that there is no
employer duty to protect patients from sexual assault arising from the
special relationship between patients and therapists' employers. Further,
employers are not liable for negligent supervision unless they have real
or constructive knowledge of the danger posed by a particular therapist,
even though transference and its attendant risks are foreseeable.
The failings in existing Washington agency law reflect a failure to
appreciate the foreseeability of the transference phenomenon. A proper
appreciation of the foreseeable risks posed by transference would extend
employer liability under existing legal tests for respondeat superior, an
employer's duty of protection arising from a special relationship, and
negligent supervision. Washington courts should adjudicate future claims
of employer liability for sexually exploitative therapists by recognizing
the foreseeability of transference.

